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Abstract
Determining the social cost of carbon emissions (SCC) is a crucial
step in the economic analysis of climate change policy as the US govern-
ments recent decision to use a range of estimates of the SCC centered at
$77/tC (or, equivalently, $21/tCO2) in cost-benet analyses of proposed
emission-control legislation underlines. This note reviews the welfare eco-
nomics theory fundamental to the estimation of the SCC in both static
and intertemporal contexts, examining the e¤ects of assumptions about
the typical agents pure rate of time preference and elasticity of marginal
felicity of consumption, production and mitigation technology, and the
magnitude of climate-change damage on estimates of the SCC. We high-
light three key conclusions: (i) an estimate of the SCC is conditional on
a specic policy scenario, the details of which must be made explicit for
the estimate to be meaningful; (ii) the social discount rate relevant to in-
tertemporal allocation decisions also depends on the policy scenario; and
(iii) the SCC is uniquely dened only for policy scenarios that lead to an
e¢ cient growth path because marginal costs and benets of emission mit-
igation diverge on ine¢ cient growth paths. We illustrate these analytical
conclusions with simulations of a growth model calibrated to the world
economy.
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1 Seven Propositions and the Economics of Cli-
mate Change
Economic analysis of potential e¤ects of climate change is often based on stan-
dard neoclassical welfare economics. This policy note works through the details
of this analysis. The discussion begins with a comparative static model at
the level of intermediate microeconomic theory, and then goes on to consider
intertemporal complications. We present our main conclusions in the form of
seven propositions in lieu of an introduction. The corresponding analysis is
presented in the subsequent sections.
I. In the standard static textbook model of trade-o¤s between environmen-
tal quality and ordinaryconsumption, equilibrium environmental quality at a
sub-optimal business as usual(BAU) point is the result of a negative (emis-
sion) externality. A free lunch is available in that individuals could increase
both conventional consumption and environmental quality.
II. Only at an e¢ cient allocation of environmental quality and consumption
is there an unambiguous measure of social marginal cost. The willingness-to-
pay for environmental improvement on the part of the typical individual and
the social marginal cost of achieving an increased consumption of the good must
be equal.
III. In dynamic analysis of environmental quality and consumption, a typ-
ical individual will have a short-term discount rate which is the sum of a pure
rate of time preference and the product of the elasticity of her marginal utility
of consumption with respect to her level of consumption times the growth rate
of her consumption. Consumption growth rates will change as the economy
evolves over time so that reasoning in terms of a constant social discount rate
is beside the point. Whether the pure rate is a (small) positive number or zero
is of secondary importance.
IV. Estimates of costs and benets of greenhouse gas mitigation must be
conditional on a scenario that species a reference path of consumption and
environmental quality, as well as on the felicityfunction and pure rate of time
preference assumed for the typical individual and the technology described by
particular production, damage and mitigation functions. The discount rates at
which the present value of costs and benets must be calculated also depend on
the reference path of consumption implied by a particular scenario.
V. Numerical simulations suggest that an optimalstrategy for mitigation
of climate change (with the social cost of mitigation equal to present discounted
value of damages avoided) could be achieved by reallocating about 10% of cur-
rent world investment (2.5% of world output) to emission mitigation. The so-
cial discount rate would decline as consumption growth slows. As is typical in
dynamic optimization models without complicated constraints on timing, miti-
gation outlays as a share of output would be higher during early phases of the
plan. (A corollary is that since mitigation may be less costly in developing
countries, it should be frontloadedthere.)
VI. On an optimal path, a plausible estimate of the marginal cost and benet
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of mitigation is about $200 per tonne of carbon ($55/tCO2). On a BAU path the
marginal cost would be about $160/t of carbon ($44/tCO2), but the marginal
benet would be about $1500/t of carbon ($410/tCO2) .
VII. The costs of mitigation are reasonably well understood. Potential dam-
ages from climate change are much harder to evaluate, but could be very high.
A key result in the theory of decision-making under uncertainty is that if dam-
ages from climate change rise non-linearly with the extent of change, then the
avoidance of bad outcomes should be weighed more heavily than the attainment
of good ones. Investing 2.5% of GDP in mitigation would be a much less serious
mistake than not investing and following a BAU path to climate catastrophe.
In the academic and policy debates a common assertion is that mitigation
of climate change will require a sacrice of current consumption (Karp, 2009).
Propositions I and II suggest that this view is misguided.
Many discussions of climate change (Arrow, 2007; Hope, 2006; Nordhaus,
2011; Tol and Antho¤, 2010) reason in terms of a constant rate of discount, ig-
noring the dynamic transienttransition from the sub-optimal present resource
allocation toward optimal steady growth at a constant rate and also neglecting
to take account of the sharp decline in consumption on BAU paths that can
lead to very low or even negative social discount rates. Propositions III and IV
show the need to correct these presumptions.
Gradually increasing mitigation e¤orts in an optimal plan is recommended
by Nordhaus (1992) and others. Proposition V suggests that complicated as-
sumptions about timing of benets and costs would be required to support this
type of conclusion. Whether there is any evidence to support these assumptions
remains to be seen.
Propositions VI and VII suggest that mitigation is feasible at a relatively
low cost and that failure to invest in mitigation could lead to disaster. This
nding extends the reasoning of Weitzman (2009) to a deterministic setting.
2 Welfare economics revisited
Before tackling the complexities introduced by the inherently intertemporal and
intergenerational character of the greenhouse gas problem, it is useful to review
these fundamentals in the static context in which they are introduced in inter-
mediate microeconomics courses (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2009).
The heavy line concave to the origin in Figure 1 is a production possibilities
frontier between environmental quality (on the horizontal axis) and conventional
consumption (on the vertical axis), which it is convenient to measure in dollars.
With this convention, the slopes of straight lines in the gure can be interpreted
as the negative of money prices for environmental quality. Following a long tra-
dition in welfare economics, we assume that there are social indi¤erence curves
representing consistent social preferences over allocations of resources. It is per-
haps most convenient in this context to think that there are many members of
society who are identical, at least in their preferences over this tradeo¤, and that
the indi¤erence curves are those of a typical or representative individual.
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Figure 1: Static decisions of allocation between consumption and environmental
quality in the absence (OPT) and presence (BAU) of a negative externality
An e¢ cient (Pareto-optimal) allocation is denoted by the point OPT where the
typical individuals indi¤erence curve is tangent to the production possibilities
frontier. At this point the typical individuals willingness-to-pay for environ-
mental quality, pOPT , equals the social marginal cost of environmental quality
in terms of conventional consumption, mcOPT , thus providing an unambiguous
marginal social cost and benet of environmental quality.
This society, however, nds itself at the sub-optimal point BAU, where the
typical individuals indi¤erence curve intersects the production possibilities fron-
tier. At allocations of this kind the typical individuals willingness-to-pay for
environmental quality, pBAU , is higher than the social marginal cost of envi-
ronmental quality, mcBAU . One reason why a point like BAU might be an
equilibrium for this society is that environmental quality is a public good (pos-
sibly resulting from open access or a negative externality): the social production
possibilities frontier represents what would happen if all the identical members
of society contributed more to environmental quality, but each of them believes
that if she alone made a larger contribution the others would not reciprocate.
As a result, each typical individual perceives the cost of environmental quality
as higher than its social cost given coordinated actions.
What is the social cost (or benet) of environmental quality at a point
like BAU? In one sense, environmental quality is free at BAU, because the
typical individual can have more of it with no loss, in fact, a gain, in well being,
since moving down the production possibilities frontier from BAU towards OPT
puts the typical individual on higher and higher indi¤erence curves. The most
important message of Figure 1 is that this free lunch is available, and worth
the di¤erence uOPT   uBAU to the typical individual. Welfare economists often
decompose the movement from BAU to OPT into a substitution e¤ect, which
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takes the society from BAU to a point SUB on the same indi¤erence curve
as BAU but with a typical individuals willingness-to-pay equal to the social
marginal cost at OPT, and an income e¤ect, which takes the society from SUB
to OPT, allowing the typical individual to realize the welfare gains implicit in the
ine¢ ciency of BAU through some pattern of increased conventional consumption
and environmental quality. In summary,
Proposition I. In the standard static textbook model of trade-o¤s between
environmental quality and ordinary consumption, equilibrium environmental
quality at a sub-optimal business as usual (BAU) point is the result of a
negative externality. A free lunchis available in that individuals could increase
both conventional consumption and environmental quality.
In the context of climate change, this market failure for GHG emissions
has long been understood (for early acknowledgments, see Nordhaus (1977)
and Schelling (1992); for more recent statements, see Arrow (2007) and Stern
(2007)). Chichilnisky and Heal (1994) are among the rst to correctly account
for the public good nature of the atmosphere in their economic analysis. Sinn
(2007), Foley (2009) and Stern (2010) make the free lunch arguments in a
dynamic context.
Policy makers in this society might try to reason this out in terms of a cost-
benetanalysis of making a small move toward higher environmental quality
starting from BAU. They would nd that the typical individuals willingness-to-
pay for environmental quality in terms of conventional consumption (the social
benet of such a move) would exceed the social marginal cost.
This simple example illustrates fundamental points about the concept of
social (marginal) cost. The social marginal cost of a good (or bad) depends on
the current allocation of resources. At an ine¢ cient allocation there will be two
di¤erent measures of social marginal cost and benet, reecting the possibility
of a Pareto-improving change in allocation. These measures will depend on the
allocation itself. The implication is
Proposition II. Only at an e¢ cient allocation of environmental quality and
consumption is there an unambiguous measure of social marginal cost. The
willingness-to-pay for environmental improvement on the part of the typical in-
dividual and the social marginal cost of achieving an increased consumption of
the good must be equal.
3 The greenhouse gas problem
Carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases accumulate in he atmosphere in
part as the consequence of humans burning fossil fuels, cutting down forests,
and grazing ruminant animals. There is strong reason to believe that the ac-
cumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere will lead to signicant and
ultimately catastrophic climate change that on average will have deleterious
e¤ects on human well being. Because the half-life of carbon dioxide in the at-
mosphere is on the order of one to three hundred years, the economic analysis
of the trade-o¤s involved in managing this problem inevitably require a consid-
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eration of the intergenerational distribution of costs and benets of investment
in mitigating emissions.
One simple (perhaps too simple, but illuminating) representation of this
problem is to consider as a rst approximation a society of identical individuals
confronting the tradeo¤ between conventional consumption and environmental
quality (or more specically greenhouse gas accumulation in the atmosphere)
over time. In order to include intergenerational distribution in this setting, it
is natural to suppose that the typical individual includes the welfare of future
generations in her preferences. (This is only a rst step toward a more complete
analysis that would take account of other di¤erences among the individuals
involved, such as their geographic location and income.)
3.1 Discounting marginal benets
In this intertemporal setting conventional consumption and environmental qual-
ity are paths c = fc1; : : : ; cT g ; e = fe1; : : : ; eT g specifying the levels of conven-
tional consumption and environmental quality available to the typical individ-
ual at each time period starting from the present (year or decade, for example)
far into the future. To simplify notation, we will assume that population and
employment are constant over time. It is convenient to measure conventional
consumption in terms of 2012 dollars, and environmental quality either in terms
of the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases (parts per million of car-
bon dioxide by volume) or average planetary temperature. One way to represent
the preferences of a typical individual in this setting is through a discounted
felicityfunction that depends on total conventional consumption:
U [c] 
TX
t=1
u [ct]
(1 + )t
(1)
The function U [:] has as its arguments the whole path of conventional con-
sumption; it is dened to be the sum of felicity, u[:], which has as its argument
the level of conventional consumption in each period, discounted by the pure
rate of time preference, . The assumptions that the felicity function and pure
rate of time preference are invariant over time are convenient simplications.
For any given path of consumption, c, we can dene a discount rate, r[c]t, for
each period by asking how much the representative agent would have to be paid
in period t+1 to compensate for a small reduction of consumption c in period
t, which would require the ratio of her utility loss in period t to her utility gain
in period t + 1 to be 1. It is convenient to write gt =
ct+1
ct
  1 for the growth
rate of consumption from period t to t + 1, and t =  u00 [ct] ct=u0 [ct] for the
elasticity of the typical individuals marginal utility of consumption with respect
to consumption evaluated at the consumption level in period t. In general,  [ct]
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is a function of ct.1 Since
u0[c(1 + g)]  u0[c] + u00[c]gc = u0[c]

1 +
u00[c]c
u0[c]
g

= u0[c](1  g)
we can evaluate the discount rate:
1 

u0 [ct]c
(1 + )t
=
u0 [ct (1 + gt)] (1 + r[c]t)c
(1 + )t+1

 1 + 
1 + r[c]t
u0 [ct]
u0 [ct] (1  tgt)
or
(1 + r[c]t) (1  tgt)  1 + r[c]t   tgt = 1 + 
or
r[c]t  + tg[c]t (2)
with (2) holding with equality for CES utility. The crucial point to remember
is that the discount rate in (2) refers to a specic period on a specic path of
consumption.
A standard assumption in cost-benet analysis is that investment projects
have marginal e¤ects on a specic consumption path. In such scenarios, the
consumption path is invariant to di¤erent scenarios. The cost and benet of
climate change mitigation, however, entail reallocations of resources at a non-
marginal scale so that the assumption of exogenous consumption paths does
not hold (Heal, 2009; Dietz and Hepburn, 2013); discount rates can only be
discussed in connection with a specic consumption scenario.
Even if we assume that the elasticity of marginal felicity with respect to
consumption is invariant over time, the typical individuals discount rate varies
over time if the growth rate of consumption varies over time. This case is
particularly relevant to evaluating investments in mitigation that would vary
the typical individuals consumption around a BAU path, because BAU paths
are prone to climate catastrophes in which the growth rate of consumption
becomes negative for signicant periods of time.
Many thoughtful welfare economists and economic philosophers argue that
there are no good reasons for individuals to discount the felicity of future gen-
erations at all, so that the pure rate of time preference ought to be taken as
 = 0. But equation (2) warns us that this emphatically does not mean that
the relevant discount rate for consumption on a particular growth path is zero
(Heal, 2009). In fact, this case underlines the important point that the rel-
evant discount rate for consumption itself may be negative in periods where
consumption is shrinking on a BAU path due to climate damage. In summary,
Proposition III. In dynamic analysis of environmental quality and consump-
tion, a typical individual will have a short-term discount rate which is the sum
of a pure rate of time preference and the product of the elasticity of her marginal
utility of consumption with respect to her level of consumption times the growth
1A very common rst approximation specication of the felicity function is to assume a con-
stant elasticity of marginal felicity with respect to consumption: u[c]  c1  1
1  or ln[c] if  =
1. With u0[c] = c  ; and u00[c] =  c  1, this implies  u00[c]c
u0[c] = .
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rate of her consumption. Consumption growth rates will change as the economy
evolves over time so that reasoning in terms of a constant social discount rate
is beside the point. Whether the pure rate is a (small) positive number or zero
is of secondary importance.
Given a path of consumption for the typical individual c = fc1; : : : ; cT g, the
present discounted value of a small variation in consumption in period t, ct,
which might be the result of a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions is 
tY
=1
1
1 + r[c]
!
ct
where each r is given by (2). In periods where r[c]t is negative, which can
occur if g[c]t is negative, the discount factor will actually be greater than unity.
On paths with sustained declines in the consumption of the typical individual,
the present value may be comparable to or a multiple of the consumption benet
associated with an investment in reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
This is equivalent to discounting the path of consumption at a sequence of
average discount rates R[c] = fR[c]1; : : : ; R[c]T g where
1
1 +R[c]t

t =
tY
=1
1
1 + r[c]
or
1
1 +R[c]t
=
 
tY
=1
1
1 + r[c]
!
1=t (3)
The present discounted value of a stream of consumptionc = fc1; : : : ;cT g,
given a reference consumption path c is thus
TX
t 1
ct
1 +R[c]t
(4)
3.2 Marginal cost of environmental quality
Technology constrains the possible paths of conventional consumption and en-
vironmental quality achievable given currently and prospectively available re-
sources. One widely adopted approach to the economic analysis of climate
change assumes that potential output in each period depends on the conven-
tional capital stock available in that period, but that the level of environmental
quality determines the proportion of this potential output that survives the
damage associated with climate change in usable form. This usable output then
has to be divided between conventional consumption, conventional investment,
and investment in mitigating greenhouse has emissions. These assumptions are
represented mathematically as constraints:
kt+1 = (1  )kt + z [et] f [kt] mt   ct
et+1 = (1 + )et   f [kt] + g
h
mt
z[et]f [kt]
i
z [et] f [kt] ;
(5)
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or
F [c; e; k;m] = 0 (6)
In this formalism, kt represents the conventional stock of capital, y = f [kt]
represents potential output, z [et] is the proportion of potential output that sur-
vives climate damage, mt is investment in mitigation of greenhouse gas emis-
sions,  is the proportion of the existing conventional capital stock that is lost
in each period to depreciation,  is the rate of emissions of greenhouse gases
from (potential) production, g[:] is the rate of mitigation, and  is the sponta-
neous improvement in environmental quality due to natural decay of greenhouse
gases. The functional F [:] in (6) summarizes the constraints in (5), and therefore
depends on the complete paths of consumption, environmental quality, conven-
tional capital, and mitigation investment through the technological constraints
(5). It is a representation of the intertemporal production possibilities set.
Since this technology includes the damage of climate change in the survival
function, z[:], it is consistent with the assumption that the felicity function de-
pends only on consumption per capita (or, for simplicity, per employed worker),
as we worked out above.
What is the marginal cost of a change in the path of environment qual-
ity? Suppose, given reference paths of mitigation investment, consumption,
and conventional capital, m; c; k, (sometimes referred to as a scenario) that
lead under the constraints (5) to a path of environmental quality e[c; k;m]
(F [c; e[c; k;m]; k;m] = 0), we want to achieve a change in the path of environ-
mental quality e = e[m+m; c+c; k+k]  e[m; c; k] also consistent with
the technological constraints (5) (so that F [c+c; e+e;m+m; k+k] = 0).
If the reference path is not optimal, it will be possible to nd technologically
feasible alternate paths for which U = U [c + c]   U [c] > 0. Thus unless
the reference path is optimal, the marginal cost in terms of the typical agents
utility of environmental quality is negative, as in the static example of the rst
section of this note.
Estimates of the marginal cost of environmental quality (for example, re-
duced atmospheric GHG concentrations) must implicitly hold one of the di-
mensions of the reference path constant, for example the path of conventional
capital. Using (4), we see that the path m[e;k = 0] satises
et+1 = et+g
0
t

mt
z [et] f [kt]
  z
0
tetmt
z [et] 2f [kt]

z [et] f [kt]+g

mt
z [et] f [kt]

f [kt] z
0
tet or
mt =

 et  mt z
0
tet
zt

1 + gtg0t
ztf [kt]
mt

et
et
+ et+1g0t
and
ct =
z0tet
zt
z [et] f [kt]
et
et
 mt
The marginal cost of the e path then can be calculated as the present
discounted value of the corresponding c path at the discount rate path R[c]
dened in the last section.
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3.3 Costs and benets are conditional on reference paths
We summarize these conclusions in
Proposition IV. Estimates of costs and benets of greenhouse gas mitigation
must be conditional on a scenario that species a reference path of consumption
and environmental quality, as well as on the felicityfunction and pure rate of
time preference assumed for the typical individual and the technology described
by particular production, damage and mitigation functions. The discount rates
at which the present value of costs and benets must be calculated also depend
on the reference path of consumption implied by a particular scenario.
4 An example
As an example of the working out of these ideas concretely, consider the model
of Rezai et al (2012). This model assumes a typical individual with an isoelastic
utility of consumption per capita, and a technology for conventional capital
accumulation of the same type as (5). This typical individual is assumed, in
line with much of the existing literature (Nordhaus, 2008), to have a pure rate
of time preference of 1% per year, and an elasticity of marginal utility with
respect to consumption of -2. The environmental quality variable in that paper
is atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide (which is treated as a bad,
requiring suitable changes of sign in (5)). All other parameter values are taken
from Rezai et al. (2012) who calibrate the model to match data for the world
economy in 2009.
The center of this paper is the calculation of paths for consumption, conven-
tional capital, environmental quality, climate change damage, and mitigation
under two sets of assumptions. The optimal path (OPT) is calculated by max-
imizing the typical individuals utility under the full technological constraints
(5), thus assuming that the GHG emission externality is completely internalized
through some combination of policies, which might take the form of cap-and-
trade markets, carbon taxes, or direct controls on emissions. This path implies
a path of shadow prices (Lagrange multipliers) for carbon emissions, which gov-
erns consumption, conventional investment, and mitigation expenditures (see
Chichilnisky and Sheeran (2009) for an interpretation of these shadow prices
as the market prices for emissions in a cap-and-trade system). On the optimal
path the marginal cost of mitigation is equal in each period to the marginal
benet from avoiding climate damage. On this path (see Figure 2), given to-
days technology and population size, per capita consumption rises smoothly
from about $6,000 (measured in current U.S. dollars) to about $7,500 over next
100 years of the simulation. The carbon price declines from about $200/t of
carbon ($55/tCO2) to a steady level of around $175/tC ($48/tCO2) This car-
bon price induces the expenditure of around 3% of world output on mitigation
in the early periods, declining to 1.5% in the steady state, and investment in
mitigation which is su¢ cient to return atmospheric concentrations of carbon
dioxide to pre-industrial levels, and reduce climate damage to negligible levels.
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Figure 2: Model simulations for the world economy in the absence (OPT) and
presence (BAU) of the negative emission externality
Our SCC estimates are within the usual (wide) range of numbers (Kuik et al.,
2009; McKinsey and Company, 2009). If we modify mitigation technology to
preclude negative emissions, the SCC would rise. On this optimal path the
implied real interest rate (as dened by (2) above) declines from above 2% in
early periods to the pure rate of time preference 1% in the steady state. This
path corresponds to the OPT type of allocation pictured in Figure 1 above.
Proposition V.Numerical simulations suggest that an optimalstrategy for
mitigation of climate change (with the social cost of mitigation equal to present
discounted value of damages avoided) could be achieved by reallocating about
10% of current world investment (2.5% of world output) to emission mitiga-
tion. The social discount rate would decline as consumption growth slows. As
is typical in dynamic optimization models without complicated constraints on
timing, mitigation outlays as a share of output would be higher during early
phases of the plan. (A corollary is that since mitigation may be less costly in
developing countries, it should be frontloaded there.)
The business-as-usual (BAU) path makes the same assumptions about the
preferences of the typical individual and the technology of world production and
greenhouse-gas emission and accumulation as on the OPT path. The di¤erence
is that the cost of greenhouse-gas emission remain external and are not taken
into account, i.e. the shadow price of greenhouse gas emissions is set to zero on
the BAU path, and the typical individual chooses consumption, conventional
investment, and mitigation levels to maximize utility subject to the resulting
budget constraint, correctly anticipating the actual atmospheric accumulation
of greenhouse gases that results. The mathematical assumption that the shadow
price of greenhouse gas emissions is zero, like the BAU point in Figure 1 above,
implies that although the typical agent correctly forecasts the accumulation of
greenhouse gases and the resulting climate damage to economic production,
she does not adjust her individual consumption, investment, and mitigation
spending to take account of their actual impact on emissions and climate change.
With a zero shadow (or market) price of carbon, the typical individual makes
no mitigation investment at all.
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The BAU path in these simulations follows the OPT path closely for sev-
eral decades, but then diverges sharply due to a climate catastrophe, rapidly
rising economic damages attributable to high greenhouse gas concentrations in
the atmosphere. These damages reduce the e¤ective productivity of labor and
conventional capital, and force per capita consumption to drastically lower lev-
els, which fall signicantly below current levels and stabilize at around $4,500
per capita. On this BAU path, as we might expect, GHG concentrations rise
steadily, which ultimately imposes a loss of about 30% of potential output to cli-
mate damage. The implied real interest rate on the BAU path starts somewhat
lower than on the OPT path, at around 2% per annum, and then fall below
the pure rate of time preference 1% after the climate catastrophe, which per
capita consumption levels are falling steadily. Rezai et al. (2012) assume exoge-
nous technological progress and population growth. Higher productive capacity
increases income levels and lowers the cost of mitigation. It also worsens the
externality, leading to steeper falls in consumption per capita and interest rates.
These low real interest rates reect the strong desire of the typical individual
to shift consumption from the periods preceding the climate catastrophe to
the periods of the climate catastrophe. Because she anticipates high levels of
consumption before the climate catastrophe relative to the low levels of con-
sumption during and after the climate catastrophe, the typical individual will
make investments with real rates of return below the pure rate of time prefer-
ence under these circumstances. While there is no e¤ective shadow or market
price for greenhouse gas emissions on the BAU path, it is possible to calculate
the implied price of carbon on this path using the methods developed in the pre-
vious sections of this note. In contrast to the OPT path, where the carbon price
starts at around $200/tC ($55/tCO2) and declines steadily over time, on the
BAU path the implied carbon price starts at about $2,000/tC ($550/tCO2) and
soars to a peak of around $3,500/tC ($950/tCO2) at the height of the climate
catastrophe. It is important to note that this is owed not only to high damage
levels, but also to low discount rates implied by falling consumption possibilities
while technology and preferences are kept unchanged. Ackerman and Stanton
(2012) derive similar social carbon prices for optimal paths by changing climate,
damage, and preference parameters.
4.1 What is the social cost of carbon in this model?
This question can be answered only in relation to some particular scenario that
denes a reference path. If the scenario is the OPT scenario, which envisions
the e¤ective internalization of the greenhouse gas emission externality in the
near future, the social cost of carbon can be measured either by the discounted
present value of the damages imposed on the economy by the emissions from a
tonne of carbon, or by the marginal cost of mitigating those emissions, since on
an optimal path these measures must be equal. With the damage, production,
and mitigation technologies assumed in the model, the social cost of a tonne
of carbon at present is around $200 ($55/tCO2). This estimate is signicantly
higher than estimates of a social cost of carbon dioxide on the order of $77/tC or,
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equivalently, $21/tCO2 (Interagency working group, 2010), which are the basis
of current and future U.S. climate policy according to Ackerman and Stanton
(2012).
If the scenario dening the reference path for consumption is the BAU sce-
nario, however, the question of the social cost of carbon becomes more compli-
cated. In this type of non-optimal (second-best) scenario, there are two possible
meaningful answers. One is the discounted present value of future damages im-
posed by the emissions from burning 1 t of carbon, which, given the models
assumptions, is about $1500/t, 7 times the value on the OPT path. The other
is the marginal cost of mitigating the emissions from 1 t of carbon, which are
actually somewhat lower than the OPT path, about $160/t. (The reason the
BAU marginal cost of mitigation is lower than the OPT marginal cost is that
the model assumes diminishing returns to mitigation investment, and the BAU
level of mitigation, zero, is smaller than the OPT level of mitigation of about
1.5% of world output.) To summarize,
Proposition VI. On an optimal path, a plausible estimate of the marginal
cost and benet of mitigation is about $200 per tonne of carbon ( $55/tCO2).
On a BAU path the marginal cost would be about $160/t of carbon ( $44/tCO2),
but the marginal benet would be about $1500/t of carbon ( $410/tCO2).
5 Methodological fallacies in GHG cost-benet
analysis
Because estimates of costs of GHG emissions, benets of emission mitigation,
and the rates at which it makes sense to discount these costs and benets are
logically conditioned on a scenario that species reference paths for consump-
tion and environmental quality, analysts who treat any of these concepts as
independent of reference path assumptions are vulnerable to methodological
error.
It does not make sense, for example, to compare the average of estimated
present discounted benets of GHG emission mitigation under various scenarios
to the average of estimated present discounted costs even if these averages
refer to the same set of scenarios. Unfortunately this type of comparison is
frequently the content of studies of the social cost of carbon intended to inform
policy makers.
The results of the Interagency working group (2010) are subject to two
errors pointed out in this note. First, the study assumed xed interest rates
for its scenarios (5%, 3%, and 2,5% per year). The SCC was then calculated by
discounting future damages from carbon emissions using one of these interest
rate parameters. In conventional cost-benet analysis, interest rates are taken
to be given as investment projects are assumed to be small, i.e. not large
enough to a¤ect the overall allocation of resources. We argue that this is not
the case when considering the problem of climate change. Climate change is
happening on very large geographical and temporal scales and, if left unchecked,
13
can easily alter the allocation of resources and with it the trajectory of the
interest rate. Second, the study used three prominent climate-economy models
for its assessment of the SCC: FUND (Antho¤ and Tol, 2010), PAGE (Hope,
2006; Stern, 2006) and DICE (Nordhaus, 2008). Each model was used to assess
the costs of pre-determined emission scenarios. To boil the three di¤ering SCC
time prole down to a single one, averages were taken.
The three models used in the study are themselves subject to some of the
fallacies discussed in this note. FUND and PAGE rely on assumptions of exoge-
nous growth paths of output and consumption. Through the adoption of (2),
their discount rate is xed by exogenous changes in consumption. The assump-
tion of the rule in (2), which is based on optimal saving behavior, is, however,
dubious in light of exogenous investment, consumption, and output trajectories.
The guiding principles in building FUND and PAGE were not general equilib-
rium considerations, but the aspirations of creating comprehensive accounts of
the e¤ects and costs of climate change. Omitting the possibility that climate
change can alter the allocation of resources, through e.g. inducing signicant
reductions in future consumption possibilities, these models either implicitly as-
sume that either climate change is not a serious problem or base their welfare
analysis on weak economic footing.
The third model used in the interagency study, DICE, is the only model
which is based on the kind of intertemporal optimization outlined above; op-
timal saving behavior guarantees that general equilibrium considerations are
taken into account and that (2) holds with equality. Nordhaus (2007) has been
adamant about pointing out its implication for the estimation of discount rates
and argues that the pure rate of time preference has to be chosen descriptively,
i.e. in a way to reproduce interest rates observed in actual markets (Arrow et
al., 1996). In the view of the descriptionists, mitigation investment has to
yield at least the same return as the capital investment it displaces. However,
their arguments usually implicitly assume a rst-best world in which resources
are allocated optimally and price signals represent accurate measures of scarcity
(Stiglitz, 1982, Heal, 2009). Most importantly, Nordhaus (2008, 2011) and other
proponents do not take into account the failure in the market for GHG emis-
sions (Rezai, 2011). The externality induces market participants to overvalue
conventional and undervalue climate capital (Foley, 2009). As a result, the
observable market interest rate is distorted and the market interest rate corre-
sponding to an economy with an internalized externality would be lower. One
implication of this is that SCC is underestimated due to the assumption of a
too high pure rate of time preference. The imposition of the assumption of an
optimal world additionally lowers SCC estimates because on optimal paths the
SCC is limited by the marginal cost and benet of mitigation. Such scenarios
do not report the current of SCC, the social cost of carbon emissions in a world
in which they pose an uncorrected externality.
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6 Risks
There are important uncertainties inherent in the greenhouse gas mitigation
problem. As compared with other problems of projecting economic growth over
long time horizons, which must also make assumptions about the productivity
of labor and other inputs to production, the most salient of these uncertainties
concern the damages from climate change and the costs of mitigation.
The cost of mitigation is the more straightforward and tractable of these
problems. There already exist a spectrum of emission-mitigation technologies,
ranging from substitution of sustainable energy sources such as solar power for
burning of fossil fuels to remediations like carbon sequestration either at the
point of combustion, or directly from the atmosphere. These mitigation tech-
nologies exist at various stages of maturity, from systems currently available
on the market, through systems at various stages of technical development.
Behind these technologies we have a very well-developed understanding of the
science relevant to mitigation. The existing technologies serve to put credible
upper bounds on the initial marginal cost of mitigation. The rate at which
returns to these technologies will diminish as they are scaled up in size is less
well-established, though educated assessments informed by the underlying sci-
ence can reduce these uncertainties to levels comparable to those encountered
in other public-policy decisions. (There is also a strong presumption that once
vigorous and large-scale markets for these technologies were established by poli-
cies to control the greenhouse gas emission externality, economies of scale and
learning-by-doing would to some degree o¤set these diminishing returns.) Thus
the costs of doing something about mitigation are fairly well understood.
The damages to be anticipated from climate change are subject to much
greater uncertainties, arising from our imperfect understanding of the non-
linearities of climate interactions that will become increasingly important at
higher atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, and the complexities of
assessing the economic damage to be attributed to climate change. From a prac-
tical point of view, however, these uncertainties may not be a severe obstacle to
the establishment of responsible and prudent public policy.
The most important point is that on paths in which we make a signicant
e¤ort to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, greenhouse gas concentrations will
not rise much beyond present levels (and may over time fall back closer to pre-
industrial levels). In these scenarios the speculative question of just how severe
a climate catastrophe will be or at what levels of atmospheric accumulation of
greenhouse gases would precipitate it become irrelevant to policy because they
will never eventuate.
The other side of this coin is that on BAU-type paths with very low levels
of mitigation investment, it is quite certain that greenhouse gas accumulations
will rise e¤ectively without any limit. Thus even if a model makes very large
errors in associating particular levels of greenhouse gas accumulation with par-
ticular levels of economic damage through adopting some particular damage
function, sooner or later on BAU paths catastrophic levels of economic dam-
age are highly likely. The exact timing of a climate catastrophe may be quite
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uncertain, but the eventual occurrence of one is much more likely. From the
cost-benet point of view taken in this note, the key point is when a climate
catastrophe imposes sharp reductions in economic welfare on the world popu-
lation, the implicit real interest rate will fall sharply and in some scenarios can
become negative. Whether this occurs in 200 or 400 years it has the e¤ect of
greatly increasing the present discounted value of emissions damage, and hence
the marginal benet of avoiding that damage through mitigation of emissions,
through the negative discount rate e¤ect. A similar argument was made by
Weitzman (2009) in the context of fat-tailed structural uncertainty.
The general conclusion of statistical decision theory, which analyzes rational
policy making under uncertainty, is that when loss is a convex function of a
state variable like environmental quality the avoidance of bad outcomes must
be weighed more heavily than the chance of good outcomes in choosing policy.
At this point the relevant favorable possibilities in greenhouse gas emission
policy are the eventualities either that we will discover that greenhouse gas
accumulations will not lead to climate change through average temperature rise,
or that large temperature increases will turn out not to impose major economic
costs. Neither of these eventualities seems very probable given current scientic
evidence and knowledge. But the mistake our species would make in investing
2.5% of current output in mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions if it turned
out to be unnecessary is much less serious than the mistake we would make
in following a BAU scenario up to a climate catastrophe (see Heal, 2009, for
numerical examples; Lemoine and Traeger, 2013, and Millner et al., 2013, for
the e¤ects of such reasoning on optimal abatement strategies). In summary,
Proposition VII. The costs of mitigation are reasonably well understood.
Potential damages from climate change are much harder to evaluate, but could
be very high. A key result in the theory of decision-making under uncertainty is
that if damages from climate change rise non-linearly with the extent of change,
then the avoidance of bad outcomes should be weighed more heavily than the at-
tainment of good ones. Investing 2.5% of GDP in mitigation would be a much
less serious mistake than not investing and following a BAU path to climate
catastrophe.
7 Conclusionthe social cost of carbon
The social cost of carbon can be meaningfully estimated only in the context of
concrete scenarios of future consumption and environmental quality. Even sub-
ject to the considerable uncertainties in current scientic and economic analysis,
some conclusions seem highly probable.
On a close-to-optimal mitigation path, the social cost of carbon will be
limited by the marginal cost of mitigation, which seems to be unlikely to be
higher than $200/tC ($55/tCO2). If the burning of fossil fuels were priced at this
level, it is likely that about 2.5% of world output might be diverted to mitigation,
with the prospect of a decline in this proportion over time as greenhouse gas
accumulations recede and lower-cost mitigation technologies come on line. Since
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world investment is about 23% of world output, such climate policy would induce
a redirecting of about 10% of world investment to mitigation, which is far from
trivial. However, the uncertainties surrounding this scenario are fairly limited;
especially the concentration of atmospheric carbon and its damage, for which we
know least for unprecedented levels, would be limited to a historical or reliably
projectable range.
On a business-as-usual path where mitigation remains very low, greenhouse
gas accumulation will inexorably rise, with a high probability of triggering a
climate catastrophe at some point and imposing severe economic costs. With
this scenario and reference path, the present discounted value of carbon emission
is likely to be several multiples of the level on an optimal path, on the order of
$2,000 to $3,500/tC ($550 to $950/tCO2). This is owed to higher damage levels,
but also to lower discount rates implied by falling consumption possibilities. The
marginal cost of mitigation on these paths will be very close to and somewhat
lower than the marginal cost on the close-to-optimal paths.
Our conclusions support rapid implementation of policies which impose the
social cost of carbon on individual decision makers. The underlying welfare
economics suggest that such a shift toward optimal policy makes available e¢ -
ciency gains. The costs of a transformation of the energy base, while not trivial,
are reasonably well understood and manageable. A continuation of the current
near-zero mitigation policies will increase the concentration of atmospheric car-
bon to levels whose implications are unpredictable but potentially disastrous for
the world economy.
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